This article investigates NATO burden sharing in the 1990s in light of strategic, technological, political, and membership changes. Both an ability-to-pay and a benefitsreceived analysis of burden sharing are conducted. During 1990-99, there is no evidence of disproportionate burden sharing, where the large allies shoulder the burdens of the small.
I. INTRODUCTION
In little more than four months, the communist regimes in Europe, which had posed the greatest threat to European security for 40 years, unravelled as the Berlin Wall tumbled on 9-10 November 1989, a democratic coalition government formed in Czechoslovakia on 7 December 1989, Ceausecu's regime collapsed on 22 December 1989, and the first free elections in a generation took place in East Germany on 18 March 1990. 1 These events were followed by a unified Germany joining NATO (3 October 1990) , the official disbandment of the Warsaw Pact (1 July 1991) , and the demise of the Soviet Union (20 December 1991). But these developments, which marked the end to the cold war, were not the only factors behind the momentous change in the nature of European defense.
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on 1 August 1990 underscored that security threats to NATO's resource supplies and interests could come from "rogue states" that operate outside international conventions and norms. 2 This war also highlighted the recent revolution in military technologies, which would be greatly perfected before their next large-scale deployment against Serbia in 1999. Changes in European defense also derived from NATO's adoption of a new strategic doctrine in 1994 that calls for crisis management and peace enforcement in places even outside of Europe whenever NATO's vital interests are at risk. 3 Still other influential developments included NATO's expansion to encompass some ex-Warsaw Pact members and the significant downsizing of defense budgets among most NATO allies with the exception of Greece and Turkey.
These changes came so suddenly as to catch NATO policymakers unprepared:
almost overnight, threats to NATO security were no longer necessarily from the east, nor were they necessarily even within Europe. As such, allied forces now required the ability to be rapidly projected to theatres outside of Europe. The next generation of weapons had to be more suited to these new concerns, and less geared to those of the cold war era of nuclear deterrence. Security challenges also stemmed from transnational terrorism as grievances in other regions of the world (e.g., the Middle East) erupted in European terrorist acts designed to capture world attention. 4 The potential collapse of the transition economies and their potential return to communism presented yet another danger, which can be largely addressed through foreign assistance intended to keep these emerging-market economies buoyant.
Throughout its 50 years, NATO burden sharing has been a divisive issue. All too frequently, the United States has alleged that it has carried an "unfair" and disproportionately large amount of the alliance burden (US Committee on Armed Services, 1988) . In recent years, the US Department of Defense (DOD) must annually submit to Congress a report assessing allied contributions to the common defense (see, e.g., US DOD, 1996 . The European allies have countered these charges of undercontributions by pointing out that much of US defense spending is on nonEuropean concerns, and by devising alternative burden-sharing measures that put their contributions in a better light. Moreover, some European allies emphasized that they assumed disproportionate burdens for UN peacekeeping and for other activities (e.g., NATO infrastructure). Any assessment of burden sharing faces at least two problems:
(1) how to measure relative burdens, and (2) what activities to include in this burdensharing accounting.
To analyze the distribution of burdens among NATO allies, researchers have followed the seminal study of Olson and Zeckhauser (1966) and applied the theory of pure public goods. 5 Subsequent studies have hypothesized that defense expenditures yield multiple outputs that vary in their degree of publicness (Sandler, 1977; van Ypersele de Strihou, 1967) . By changing the mix of public and private benefits associate with defense activities, recent changes to NATO's strategic doctrine, weapon technologies, perceived threat, and membership composition can alter burden-sharing behavior.
A primary purpose of this article is to investigate burden sharing in NATO in the 1990s in light of recent changes. We apply theoretical insights from a joint product model representation of alliances (see Section II) to suggest empirical tests of burdensharing behavior so as to assess the impact of recent alterations in NATO's strategic environment on allied support of the alliance (Section III). Empirical tests of burden sharing in the 1990s are based on two alternative public finance principles: an abilityto-pay measure (Section IV) and a benefits-received measure (Section V). Another purpose is to hypothesize how burden sharing will change during the coming decade (Section VI). We are particularly interested in this change under alternative expansion scenarios. A third purpose is to devise a security burden-sharing measure that broadens security-promoting activities to go beyond defense spending (Section VII).
Concluding remarks round out the study in Section VIII.
The empirical tests indicate that there is no evidence of disproportionate burden sharing for 1990-99, so that the large allies are not shouldering the defense burdens for the small allies. In the latter 1990s, there is, however, a tiny drift upward in the positive (but insignificant) correlation between defense burdens and the allies' national income, which suggests a gradual return to disproportionate burden sharing, consistent with our theoretical prediction. This return is anticipated to be more pronounced in the years to come as changes in NATO's strategic environment have time to influence actions.
When derived benefits are compared with actual defense burdens carried, the match between the two is still significant, indicating that the joint product model with its private inducement to support defense is still relevant. If alliancewide public benefits increase in the ensuing decade as predicted, then this match may eventually become insignificant. When alternative expansion scenarios are examined, the extent of disproportionality of burden sharing increases if the alliance continues to grow.
II. ALTERNATIVE PUBLIC GOOD MODELS

A Pure Public Good Model of Alliances
If defense is purely public for the allies, then the benefits associated with defense must be nonrival and nonexcludable. Defense benefits are nonrival among allies when one ally's consumption of the unit of defense does not detract, in the slightest, from the consumption opportunities still available to other allies from that same unit. Deterrence, as provided by strategic nuclear weapons (e.g., Trident Submarines, B-2 Stealth Bombers), is nonrival among allies because, once deployed, these weapons' ability to deter enemy aggression is independent of the number of allies (or citizens) on whose behalf the retaliatory threat is made, provided that the promised retaliation is automatic and believable. If the allies underwriting deterrence have a "first-strike" advantage so that they can destroy enough of the enemy's nuclear arsenal in a preemptive attack, then any return fire would be minimal and the retaliatory pledge attains greater credibility. When, moreover, the strategic arsenal is sufficiently large to absorb an attack and still possess enough surviving missiles to deliver an unacceptable punishment to a would-be aggressor, the threatened retaliation is credible and can be made on behalf of fifteen, eighteen, or more allies. Alliances that rely on deterrence to forestall an attack share a purely public defense good, for which some essential implications follow. First, defense burdens are anticipated to be shared unevenly with the largest allies, which have the most to lose from an attack, assuming a disproportionately large burden in relations to their gross domestic product (GDP). 6 The prediction that the large, wealthy allies will shoulder the defense burdens for smaller, poorer allies is the "exploitation hypothesis." If, for example, the large ally spends $250 billion on defense and a small ally desires to spend just $5 billion, then the small ally is likely to spend very little relying instead on the protection that spills over it from its large formidable ally. This conclusion rests on the purely public assumption where the defense efforts of one ally are perfectly substitutable for those of another. If, however, this substitutability is limiting, then this disproportionality is curtailed. Second, defense spending will be allocated in a suboptimal fashion, which follows because each ally considers only its own marginal benefits and the associated marginal costs when deciding defense provision. Optimality for a pure public defense good requires that the alliancewide sum of marginal benefits be equated to marginal costs. 7 Third, the absence of rivalry in consumption implies that all friendly nations can be included in the alliance, insofar as only benefits arise from the expansion of an alliance. Fourth, cooperation needs to be fostered to address suboptimal defense levels, and can take the form of "tight" alliance linkages, whereby allies sacrifice some of their autonomy over their defense decision to the collective or a central authority (Sandler and Forbes, 1980) . Fifth, the match between benefits received from defense and the actual defense burden is anticipated for many allies to be weak owing to free riding, which shows up as a negative relationship between an ally's real defense outlays and those of its allies.
Joint Product Representation of Alliances
Researchers noticed that after the mid-1960s (see Section IV) many of the implications of the pure public good model of alliances did not hold (e.g., Russett, 1970) and, in response, offered a generalization in the form of a joint product model in which defense yields multiple outputs whose publicness varies. In particular, defense activities can produce deterrence (a pure public benefit), damage limitation or protection for times of conflict (an impure public benefit), and ally-specific outputs (private benefits).7 outputs are impurely public among allies when the associated benefits are either partially or wholly excludable by the provider, or else partially rival among the allies.
Consider conventional forces, deployed along an alliance's perimeter to keep an opposing side from penetrating its front. Because the actual deployment decision can exclude one or more allies, conventional armaments and troops display partially excludable benefits. Such forces are subject to a spatial rivalry in the form of force thinning as a given army is spread over a longer exposed border. Coalescing troops in one place along an alliance's border leads to vulnerabilities elsewhere, and it is these resulting vulnerabilities that imply rivalry in consumption.
Ally-specific benefits occur when a defense activity helps only the providing ally and yields no benefit spillovers to others. In large part, the UK efforts to thwart terrorism Consider the differences in the mix of outputs and the publicness of benefits derived from strategic and conventional weapons. By their nature, strategic weapons do not readily lend themselves to producing ally-specific benefits. Such weapons cannot be used to threaten an insurgency into submission, nor can they be assigned to thwart terrorism or provide disaster relief. If, moreover, these forces have sufficient range, they can be deployed almost anywhere with little or no thinning of strength, so that strategic nuclear forces yield primarily alliancewide purely public benefits. Some ally-specific benefits follow from the provider's control of the launch button, whose possession can allow it to extract some hegemonic concessions (Morrow, 1991) . In contrast, conventional forces possess a large share of ally-specific benefits and impurely public benefits. While it is true that formidable conventional forces deter an enemy, they can also further many ally-specific interests. Their deployment during a conflict is impurely public owing to force thinning. In essence, the extent of publicness is reflected in the ratio of excludable benefits (i.e., ally-specific and damage-limiting benefits) to total benefits received from a defense activity's outputs. This ratio depends on the reigning strategic doctrine, weapon technology, perceived threats, and alliance composition. For example, curbing the threat posed by the proliferation of nuclear forces, which is part of NATO's new crisis-management doctrine, yields purely public benefits to NATO allies and any nation in harm's way from such weapons.
The implications of the joint product model are at variance with those of the purely public deterrence representation of an alliance. First, a high ratio of excludable benefits implies that an ally must support its own defense, regardless of its economic size if it is going to be protected. As this ratio increases, the exploitation hypothesis is anticipated to lose its relevancy, so that any disproportionality between an ally's size and its defense burden is predicted to decline. Second, the presence of excludable benefits allows markets and club arrangements to promote preference revelation, thereby achieving a closer equality between marginal benefits and marginal costs. As the ratio of excludable benefits approaches one, this equality of margins becomes closer to being satisfied, thus implying greater optimality. Free riding can be curtailed with a sizable helping of excludable benefits. Third, alliance size restrictions hinge on the thinning of forces; allies with large exposed borders cause more thinning and must contribute more conventional forces to offset this thinning externality (Sandler, 1977) .
Because ally-specific benefits are not shared and deterrence can be shared at zero costs, neither of these types of benefits determines membership size. Fourth, alliance links can be kept loose and unintegrated when the ratio of excludable benefits is large, insofar as inefficiencies are small calling for little cooperative correction. Fifth, the larger is this ratio, the better is the match between benefits received and defense burdens, because a payment must be made to acquire the excludable benefits.
The location and geographical properties of a prospective ally makes a difference for both the desirability of including this ally and the extent of its bargaining strength, if included. A conventional alliance can save costs owing to the sequestration of interior borders that no longer require protection (Gardner, 1995, pp. 401-6; .
Consider an alliance of three contiguous square countries of equal sizes lined up in a row. 9 Suppose that each country's sides are of unit length costing 1 to protect. If each country provides its own defense, then each expends 4 in protecting its perimeter from an attack in all directions. If, instead, the countries form an alliance, then only 8 sides need protecting, leading to a cost saving of 4. The middle country possesses a bargaining advantage, because without its participation there would be no cost savings.
Countries with long exposed borders are less desirable entrants and, if admitted, are at a bargaining disadvantage when cost savings from sequestered borders are distributed.
Potential noncontiguous allies, such as the Baltic states (Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania), in which just Lithuania has a common 91 km border with Poland, have little to offer NATO and are unlikely entrants.
III. NATO DOCTRINES AND BURDEN SHARING
Mutual Assured Destruction: 1949-66
NATO was initially confronted with a daunting challenge: a Soviet Union bent on a westward expansion as it acquired satellite states. Unlike the NATO allies which had converted a large share of their defense industries to peacetime uses by 1949, the Soviet Union had continued to run its defense industries at the same wartime pace. As a consequence, the Soviet Union had acquired a conventional weapon advantage, which meant that NATO had to rely on US superiority in strategic nuclear weapons to counter any Soviet aggression. Thus, the alliance adopted a strategic doctrine of mutual assured destruction (MAD), whereby any Soviet territorial expansion involving NATO allies would trigger a devastating nuclear attack. Directive MC 48, approved in 1954 by the North Atlantic Council, allowed NATO to use strategic weapons to counter such aggression (Rearden, 1995, p. 73) . Any such US retaliatory response had credibility owing to a US first-strike advantage, for which Soviet nuclear assets could be neutralized by a preemptive strike. Thus, the pledged US response could be exercised with impunity. This reliance on strategic weapons meant that NATO's security rested on purely public deterrence. : 1967-80 and 1981-90 The embarrassment experienced by the Soviet Union when it had to back down during the Cuban missile crisis, owing to the US preemptive advantage, set in motion a Soviet buildup of its strategic forces. As the US lost some of its strategic advantage, NATO needed a new defense doctrine that would not result in an immediate nuclear exchange during an exigency. In 1967, NATO adopted directive MC 14/3, which embodied the doctrine of flexible response, whereby NATO would respond in a measured way to Warsaw Pact challenges. The doctrine envisioned a commensurate response to acts of aggression and allowed for an escalation if necessary. As a result of this doctrine, strategic, tactical, and conventional forces became complementary as they had to be used together, so that the extent of substitutability between allied forces and the incentives to free ride diminished (Murdoch and Sandler, 1984) . NATO allies that failed to maintain their conventional forces became the weak link that might draw an attack.
Flexible Response Eras
By relying on all three kinds of weapons, this 1967 doctrine meant that defense activities within NATO yielded joint products with varying degrees of publicness. In Table 1 , we list the defining events and doctrines for MAD and three subsequent strategic eras. On the right-hand side of the table, the implications of the appropriate underlying model are tabulated. By 1981, a host of events, as given on the left-hand side of Table 1 , increased the share of nonexcludable, purely public benefits and, in so doing, are predicted to have the influences indicated on the right. For example, the nuclear allies' buildup and modernization of their strategic arsenals increased the share of jointly produced nonexcludable public outputs. The deterrence derived from French and British enhanced strategic forces provided nonexcludable and nonrival benefits to the other European allies.
When NATO adopted the forward-defense strategy or "deep strike" in 1984, this flexible-response upgrade shifted the focus away from NATO's eastern perimeter by relying on precision-guided munitions to target and destroy Warsaw Pact's rear-echelon forces. The new strategy reduced thinning and the impurity of conventional forces, since their deployment along the front loses some of its importance; nevertheless this upgraded doctrine's reliance on conventional forces still meant that excludable joint products are important. In Table 1 , we hypothesize that the net influence of these strategic, procurement, and technological events was to augment the share of nonexcludable benefits derived from defense. In other words, these events increased the publicness of the defense activity and enhanced the concerns over disproportionate burdens and suboptimality, which the first era of flexible response greatly corrected.
Crisis-Management Doctrine: 1991-2000
With the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 and the subsequent dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the flexible-response strategy to an eastern attack lost much of its relevancy. The immediate impact was defense downsizing to take advantage of a peace dividend. As the large allies downsized to a greater extent relative to the smaller allies, defense burdens should at first shift to the latter, a tendency enhanced by Greek and Turkish military buildups. The Gulf War of 1991 underscored that threats to NATO's interests can come from so-called rogue nations. As communist regimes in Europe collapsed, ethnic conflicts, once held in check by powerful governments, erupted and threatened stability in Europe.
These developments and the need to reshape NATO to the post-cold war era resulted in a new strategic doctrine (see Table 1 ), which first emerged at a Rome Summit on 7-8 November 1991 when the ministers acknowledged that NATO must assume responsibility for ensuring Europe's security from challenges both within and beyond NATO's boundaries (Asmus, 1997, p. 37 There are a number of factors that promote an hypothesized increase in publicness. First, peacekeeping and crisis-management activities, if successful, provide an increased measure of world stability and security that benefits all nations contributors and noncontributors so that benefits are nonexcludable and nonrival. 10 Second, allies that acquire sufficient capacity to project forces to trouble spots are likely to provide a free ride in times of crises for allies that have not invested in this capability.
During the Gulf War, the United States transported much of the coalition's equipment from Europe (Klare, 1995) . Only the four largest allies the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany are currently making sizable investments in their powerprojecting capacity This increased share of purely public joint products will eventually increase free riding and, thus, place a greater burden on the richest allies once the effects of downsizing are finished. In addition, there is eventually expected to be a reduced match between defense benefits received and burdens carried, so that greater cooperation will someday be needed if allied efforts are to be efficiently allocated. The search for these relationships in Section IV-V requires some caveats. The crisismanagement shares of the allies' defense budget are still small for 1990-99, so that this movement to increased publicness may not yet be evident. Similarly, the buildup of rich allies' transport capacity is occurring in 1998-2005 and, except for 1998-99, will not be reflected in the data.
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IV. ABILITY TO PAY AND BURDEN SHARING
The standard burden-sharing measure for defense, used to reflect the ability to pay, is the share of GDP devoted to military expenditures (i.e., ME/GDP We now update these earlier burden-sharing studies using data from 1988-99.
The null hypothesis is tested with the nonparametric Spearman rank correlation coefficient (Mendenhall and Beaver, 1991 ). Spearman's rho statistic is calculated in the same fashion as the familiar Pearson correlation coefficient except that the ranks of the data replace the actual measurements, making the statistic robust to outliers and minor measurement errors which do not alter the rankings. Moreover, this statistic makes no parametric demands on the distributions of the GDP and defense burden data. This is ideal for our situation insofar as some relatively large allies (e.g., the United States) are grouped with some small ones (e.g., Luxembourg), making it unlikely that the GDP observations are generated from the same distribution. The tests of the relationship between defense burden and GDP is apt to suffer from confounding influences. For instance, a longer exposed border generally necessitates greater defensive expenditures. To the extent that larger nations tend to have greater GDP, the strength of the defense burden and GDP relationship appears greater owing to this confounding variable. To assess the role of potential confounding influences, we also test the hypotheses using Spearman's partial correlation coefficients. Intuitively, a partial coefficient measures the correlation of the residuals of two regressions: the first set comes from a regression of defense burden ranks on (say) exposed borders, while the second comes from a regression on GDP and exposed borders. With the partial correlation coefficient, we thus remove any explanatory power of the confounding variable before computing the statistic.
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The data set for the updated burden-sharing tests in Sections IV-V includes observations on military expenditures, GDP, exchange rates, population (POP), imports (IMP), exports (EXP), and exposed borders. For the fifteen NATO allies (minus Fund (1999a Fund ( , 1999b . 14 Each ally's openness measure equals its sum of exports and imports as a share of the country's GDP. Currency-based data for ME, GDP, IMP, and EXP were expressed in nominal US dollars using the current average exchange rate for each year of data with the exception of the EU countries in 1999. For these observations, data were expressed in US dollars using the 1 January 1999 exchange rates adjusted by the value of the Euro on 1 July 1999.
In Table 3 
V. BENEFIT MEASURES AND BURDEN SHARING
Benefits from defense spending arise from what is protected by both conventional and strategic arsenals: the ally's industrial base, its population, and its exposed borders. To calculate an overall measure for these defense benefits, we followed the methodology of Sandler and Forbes (1980) and computed each ally's share of NATO's GDP (i.e., ally's GDP/NATO GDP), its share of NATO's population, and its share of NATO's exposed borders. Myriad weighting schemes can be devised to aggregate these three benefit measures to derive some aggregate benefit share for each ally. In essence, the appropriate weights depend on an ally's preferences, which are not known nor easily observed. As a reasonable proxy in light of our ignorance, we weighted these shares equally by adding them up and dividing by three for an "average benefit share."
If the average benefit share is a good predictor of an ally's actual defense burden share within NATO (ME/NATO ME), then the distributions of the two measures should be similar; i.e., there should be no systematic difference between them. This new burden-sharing measure represents between-ally sharing in contrast to the earlier ME/GDP measure which denotes within-ally sharing based on country-specific variables. To determine the correspondence between defense burdens and its benefits, we used a Wilcoxon signed-rank test which is a nonparametric alternative to the familiar paired difference test (Mendenhall and Beaver, 1991 Khanna and Sandler (1996, 1997) were unable to reject the null hypothesis H 2o at five-year intervals for 1965, 1970, 1975, 1980, and 1990 , thus leading to the conclusion that during much of the flexible-response era there was a statistically significant match between defense burdens and their benefits. This finding supports the joint product model over the purely public deterrent model as the underlying paradigm.
For 1985, however, at the height of the Reagan defense buildup, the null hypothesis is rejected in favor of the alternative hypothesis. Thus, the Reagan's administration's concentration on procurement and the buildup of strategic, tactical, and other armaments appeared to increase the extent of publicness in the defense activity and, in so doing, induced more free riding, thus breaking the match between defense burdens and defense benefits.
Our update for the 1990s is indicated in Tables 4-5 , where defense burdens and average benefit shares are displayed annually for 1990-94 and 1995-99, respectively.
Data sources were the same as those described in Section IV for the Spearman test.
As in this previous test, current-year nominal data were converted to nominal US dollars using that year's exchange rates. For each country, its share of NATO's GDP, population, and exposed borders were computed and then averaged. In each table, the left column beneath each year is the actual defense burden, while the right column is the average benefit share. For example, in 1990, France assumed 8.45% of NATO total defense spending, while it received a benefit share of 6.39%, thus implying an overpayment. In that same year, the Netherlands covered 1.47% of NATO's aggregate defense spending, which is almost a perfect match for its average benefit share of 1.54%. Other figures are interpreted similarly.
The Wilcoxon R statistic for these years are: 39 in 1990; 39 in 1991; 37 in 1992; 33 in 1993; 35 in 1994; 37 in 1995; 40 in 1996; 38 in 1997; 41 in 1998, and 45 in 1999. Because none of the R statistics is less than 25 (or 40 for 1999), we cannot reject the null hypothesis; hence, there is evidence of a match between defense burdens and our proxy measure of defense benefits for each year of the 1990s.
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Based on this comparison, the joint product model still describes behavior in the post-cold war years, but the match is less significant for 1999, consistent with the increasing share of public benefits. As long as the associated distributions for defense burdens and benefits are the same, there is support for NATO's current loosely integrated alliance, because suboptimality is limited by this concordance. Figure 1 splices together a key finding of the Khanna and Sandler (1996) study with that of this study. The three time series displayed show the difference in actual defense burdens and those predicted by the average benefit share for the two North American allies, the three nuclear allies, and the four largest allies (i.e., the three nuclear allies plus Germany). Insofar as each time series shows the same pattern, we focus on the time series for North America, where this difference declined from 1970-80 as flexible response shifted more defense burdens to Europe. The Reagan buildup reversed this shift. Since 1985, the overall trend for this difference is downward, except for 1999 where a small rise is noted. The pattern for exploitation, reflected by these time series for various aggregates of the large allies, is closely in keeping with our theoretical predictions.
Next, we broadened the proxy for average benefit shares to include a fourth benefit measure of openness. In a secure environment, an ally also gains from international trade. To devise a measure for the relative benefit that an ally derives from its openness [(exports + imports)/GDP], we calculated an ally's share of NATO's aggregate openness, which equals an ally's openness divided by the sum of these openness measures for the alliance. Average benefit shares were then computed by summing each ally's four benefit shares and dividing by four. In Table 6 , we depict defense burdens and the new average benefit shares for five select years in the 1990s.
Other years display very similar values. The Wilcoxon signed-rank test statistic equals: 37 in 1991; 29 in 1992; 28 in 1993; 30 in 1994; 32 in 1995; 32 in 1996; 31 in 1997; and 33 in 1998. 18 For these new R statistics, we cannot reject the null hypothesis at the .05 level of significance. Thus, we again conclude that there is evidence of a match between defense burdens paid and defense benefits received. This inclusion of another benefit measure indicates that the results are not so sensitive to the benefit proxies chosen. Our thought experiment first consisted of computing the Spearman rank correlations between defense burdens and GDP for various scenarios in 1998 to ascertain how burdens would be shared. This experiment implies that new allies do not alter their share of GDP for defense, which, if the behavior of the three recent entrants is any indication, is a reasonable assumption. As in the case of the NATO fifteen, the data for these three NATO entrants, the other prospective entrants, and the neutral nations are obtained as follows: ME from SIPRI (1999); exposed borders from US Central Intelligence Agency (1999); and POP from International Monetary Fund (1999a, 1999b) .
VI. ALTERNATIVE NATO EXPANSION SCENARIOS
In Table 7 , we display various Spearman rank correlation coefficients and their
prob-values. The scenarios are indicated in the first column, while the number of observations is given in the second column. In the third column, the simple rank correlations increase in value as the number of allies increase for the five scenarios without the neutrals. This result suggests that, as the alliance expands, the extent of disproportionate burden sharing increases. This outcome is in complete agreement with the general principles of collective action where free riding increases with group size (Olson, 1965; Sandler, 1992) . For the scenarios involving the neutrals, this increasing disproportionality only arises with the addition of the Baltic states.
Interestingly, the neutrals share burdens today not too dissimilarly from other small allies in regards to the proportion of GDP devoted to defense. When Scenario 2 and 6 are compared for the simple rank correlation, there is increased disproportionality, but it is rather limited for the addition of so many nations. Scenario 5 and 9 suggests that the inclusion of the Baltic states is apt to have an important negative impact on burden sharing. Nearly identical patterns arise for the partial Spearman rank correlations in the fourth and sixth columns. When, however, the partial rank correlation holds only exposed borders constant, no clear pattern emerges in the fifth column except that the addition of the Baltic state leads to an augmented disproportionality in burden sharing.
As a second thought experiment, we computed the average benefit shares and defense burdens for Scenarios 2-9, where the former were based on each ally's shares of POP, GDP, and exposed borders. In Table 8 , we display these defense burdens and benefit shares for only five of eight scenarios to conserve space. 19 The Wilcoxon R along with the critical values below which the null hypothesis is rejected at the .05 level are displayed in the last row. The null hypothesis is rejected in favor of the alternative hypothesis of different underlying distributions for Scenarios 5 and 9, but not for Scenarios 2, 4, and 6. For the scenarios not depicted in 
VII. SECURITY BURDEN SHARING
Until now, there has been no convincing or successful effort in the literature to define a broader security burden-sharing measure that includes allies' defense efforts, peacekeeping support, and foreign aid activities. Surely, peacekeeping bolsters overall security, while foreign assistance does the same by creating more robust and stable economies in developing countries. It is instructive to see how the US DOD addresses this security burden-sharing issue in its annual Report on Allied Contributions to Common Defense to the US Congress (see, e.g., US DOD 1996 . In essence, this report merely presents a rank for each security-enhancing activity and allows the reader to draw his/her own conclusion. Suppose that Norway is highly ranked in peacekeeping and foreign assistance, but is lowly ranked in its defense burden as a share of GDP. Are we then to conclude that Norway assumes a respectable burden?
This is a hasty conclusion because the expenditure levels on peacekeeping and foreign aid are typically dwarfed by that on defense, so that doing more than your share on the first two does not necessarily offset a small defense burden. Taking an average of these ranks, as done by , is also ill-advised because this procedure implicitly assumes that the amounts spent are of similar magnitudes.
The security burden index proposed here adjusts for differential spending on alternative security-promoting activities. If security derives from defense, peacekeeping, and foreign aid, then the proposed measure sums the expenditures on each and then divides this sum by GDP. Ranks are assigned for these security burdens and then compared with each ally's GDP ranks. We performed these computations for 1994-97 in the base case of fifteen NATO allies, using data on defense spending, peacekeeping expenditure, and foreign aid from US DOD (1999). Because this report presents the data in real 1998 US dollars, current-year nominal values for other variables (e.g., GDP) had to be converted into real 1998 US dollars. These real figures were obtained by first "deflating" the own country values to 1998 with their respective GDP price deflator before converting to dollars with the 1998 average exchange rate.
Deflation of the own country values are accomplished by multiplying by the ratio of the 1998 price deflator to the annual price deflator. The price deflators are from
International Monetary Fund (1999a Fund ( , 1999b .
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In Table 9 , we present the various Spearman rank correlation coefficients between our security burden measure and GDP. The most interesting finding is that the results in Table 9 are closely related to those in Table 3 , where only defense burdens are correlated with GDP for comparable years. In fact, the broader measure shows a slightly elevated, but highly insignificant, positive correlation. The elevated values suggest not only that the defense burdens overwhelm the peacekeeping and foreign assistance burdens for these years, but also that the smaller countries are not, on average carrying more of the latter two combined burdens. If peacekeeping continues to grow in importance and, if, moreover, these burdens are shouldered by the large allies, as projected here, then the rank correlation between the security burdens and GDP will increase and may culminate in disproportionate burden sharing like the MAD era. Clearly, the argument that a broader security measure would reverse findings based solely on defense burdens is not supported here. The technique put forward for computing a security burden can be extended to include additional security-promoting activities.
VIII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Although the threat of nuclear Armageddon has subsided greatly since the conclusion of the cold war, Europe and its North American allies still confront myriad common security challenges from crisis management, ethnic unrests, weapons of mass destruction proliferation, rogue nations, transnational terrorism, and a Russia at war with some of its ex-republics. As the nature of the threats changes, NATO must respond with new weapons, technology, logistical doctrines, and strategies. By changing the publicness character of the shared defense activities, these developments can have profound influences on resource allocation within NATO. The NATO alliance provides a means for collective security at a bargain price, but poses collective action problems from free riding, inefficient resource allocations, and disproportionate burden sharing.
This paper applies the theoretical and empirical tools from the economic study of alliances to take stock of free riding, burden sharing, and related issues in the past.
More important, we provide an up-to-date analysis of these resource allocation concerns for NATO in the 1990s. In the process, we show that the joint product model still applies during the current crisis-management era. There continues to be a concordance between benefits received and defense burdens borne by the allies.
Moreover, there is no evidence yet of disproportionate burdens being shouldered by the large allies. At this point in time, NATO's loosely integrated institutional structure, therefore, remains appropriate. Nevertheless, theoretical arguments are put forward that hypothesize that defense burden sharing will become more disproportionately carried by the large allies in the future as spending on crisis management, force mobility, weapons nonproliferation, and high-technology weapons increases as a proportion of the defense budget. If this prediction is realized, then NATO's institutional structure may need to be tightened and, in so doing, allies' discretion will be reduced.
We also present alternative NATO expansion scenarios that may result in an increased exploitation of the large by the small if the alliance continues to expand. It would be useful to reexamine NATO's burdens in another five year to evaluate if the predicted trend to disproportionate burden sharing and a greater share of purely public output is realized.
10. On the publicness of peacekeeping, see Khanna, Sandler, and Shimizu (1998, 1999) .
11. For example, the United States plans to spend over $20 billion on strategic mobility over next five years (US Congressional Budget Office, 1997, Table 3 ).
12. provided a discussion of alternative burdensharing measures and why ME/GDP is the most appropriate ability-to-pay measure.
13. While several nonparametric statistics are available to test for association, two in particular, Kendall's tau and Spearman's rho, readily extend to partial measures.
We employed the Spearman rho because the sampling distribution for Kendall's partial tau is unknown. To obtain prob-values for this tau, we would have to resort to some sort of simulation (e.g., Hoflund, 1963) . Although not presented here, we also estimated the alternative Kendall's taus and found that the patterns of the correlations are essentially identical to those reported with Spearman's rho below.
14. The exceptions are as follows: The GDPs for Portugal in 1997 Portugal in , 1998 Portugal in , and 1999 were inferred from the ratio of ME to GDP as reported in US Department of Defense (1999) . For countries with incomplete series on imports and exports, our measure of openness in Section V was estimated as the previous year's value. In cases where population is missing, we used the previous year's value to complete the series.
15. Other partial rank correlations, not displayed, (e.g., holding exposed borders constant) indicate the same results: all coefficients are insignificant and the coefficient pattern over time is the same as those in Table 3 .
16. The Wilcoxon test involves (1) assigning ranks based on the absolute value of the differences between the two measures, and (ii) computing the sum of the ranks with positive differences and the sum with negative differences. C Some increase in disproportionality C More suboptimality and free riding C Less exclusive alliance C Need for tighter alliance link C Reduced match between benefits received and defense burdens C These predictions will take some time to show up as downsizing initially placed more burdens on the small allies Significant positive rank correlation between ME/GNP and GNP.
C van Ypersele de Strihou (1968 ) Regression 1955 , 1963 Significant coefficient on GNP when ME/GNP is regressed against the log of GNP.
C Russett (1970 ) Kendall 1950 Significant rank correlation between ME/GNP and GNP for all sample years, with a marked decline in correlation starting in 1961. *prob-values in parentheses, indicating the probability of a type I error when testing the null hypothesis of no association between ME/GDP and GDP versus the alternative hypothesis of a positive association. Variables: 1 ME/GDP; 2 GDP; 3 GDP/POP; and 4 Exposed borders. a Simple rank correlation coefficient. The number of allies is 18 for 1999, since Iceland is excluded. *prob-values in parentheses, indicating the probability of a type I error when testing the null hypothesis of no association between ME/GDP and GDP versus the alternative hypothesis of a positive association. Variables: 1 ME/GDP; 2 GDP; 3 GDP/POP; and 4 Exposed borders †Scenario 1 is NATO 15 excluding Iceland; Scenario 2 is NATO 15 plus 3 new entrants; Scenario 3 is NATO 18, Slovenia, and Slovakia; Scenario 4 is NATO 18, Slovenia, Slovakia, and Romania; Scenario 5 consists of Scenario 4 plus three Baltic countries (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania);Scenario 6 is NATO 18 plus 5 neutrals (Austria, Finland, Ireland, Sweden, and Switzerland);Scenario 7 is NATO 18, 5 neutrals, Slovenia, and Slovakia; Scenario 8 consists of Scenario 7 plus Romania; and Scenario 9 consists of Scenario 8 plus three Baltic countries. a Simple rank correlation coefficient. *prob-values in parentheses, indicating the probability of a type I error when testing the null hypothesis of no association between the security burden and GDP versus the alternative hypothesis of a positive association. Variables: 1 ME/GDP; 2 GDP; 3 GDP/POP; and 4 Exposed borders. a Simple rank correlation coefficient. 
